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Abstract: Each electronic (electric) device generates electromagnetic emissions during its operation. Most often these
emissions are generated unintentionally and they are radiated into the surrounding space in an uncontrolled way. In the
case of significant levels of these emissions, they can disturb the operation of other devices or can be used as typical
radio emissions. If the nature of their changes corresponds to the processed information occurring in a form of electric
signals, the mentioned emissions can be a basis for eﬀective realization of electromagnetic infiltration processes. Most
often, these emissions are classified in laboratory conditions using anechoic chambers. Inside such chambers there are
not additional sources of emissions that would increase the level of electromagnetic protection through disturbance of
sensitive emissions. The sensitive emissions have distinctive features corresponding to the processed information. Using
these emissions, the reconstruction of primary information is possible. This article presents the results of tests of a laser
printer with a two-diode laser system, operated in an open space and in oﬃce rooms, outside the anechoic chamber.
These are so-called real conditions of operation of the device. The purpose of the tests was to show the existence of risks
in a typical electromagnetic environment. Additional sources of emissions or occurring obstacles, e.g., walls of oﬃces, do
not reduce levels of sensitive emissions to safe values. The electromagnetic infiltration process is possible in each of the
mentioned environments and its eﬀects are presented in the form of reconstructed images. The distances on which the
compromising emissions are measured deserve special attention. They are equal to even several meters.
Key words: Reveal emission, protection of information, range of leakage of information, electromagnetic eavesdropping,
sensitive emission

1. Introduction
The phenomenon of electromagnetic penetration of information constitutes a great risk, especially when we
consider the processing of classified information. Classified information (e.g., top secret, secret, confidential,
restricted, or other very important material) is material that we claim is sensitive information that requires
protection of confidentiality, integrity, or availability. The possibility of eﬀective usage of sensitive emissions has
been proved multiple times, both in the case of radiated emissions [1–9] and conducted emissions [10,11]. It has
been presented that sources in the form of graphical lines (graphic card of the central processing unit, monitors,
laser of the laser printer) are the most eﬀective sources for the noninvasive process of acquisition of information.
This enables the possibility of reconstruction of the data by someone in an understandable form. The form
is images that contain the aforementioned data. However, the measurement conditions used in the literature
deviate from reality. For instance, if an anechoic chamber is used as a measurement environment, undesirable
radiated emissions that can “cover” emissions correlated with the information are eﬃciently eliminated [12–14].
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Power filters installed in the chamber fulfill an analogous function. In such conditions the range of leakage
of information is very large. The electromagnetic environment inside the anechoic chamber allows to get to
know the characteristics of many sources of electromagnetic emissions. Earlier studies and obtained results of
analyses showed the possibility of shaping emission sources. Selected results were presented in [15]. Another
issue is the phenomenon of electromagnetic infiltration in real conditions, in an environment where additional
sources of electromagnetic disturbance exist. Therefore, a question arises: does the risk from electromagnetic
infiltration of information exist in real conditions, and in particular in oﬃce rooms?
Moreover, we are often confronted with questions associated with the electromagnetic safety of commercial
devices (a commercial device is a device oﬀered on the market without trade embargo in contrast to a special
device such as the so-called TEMPEST device) and the necessity to apply modified devices of a very high
purchase cost. The cost oscillates between six and eight thousand euros. It is not a normal price. Using
commercial devices is an option if they are appropriately selected. This selection is based on comparison
of measured emissions of these devices with appropriate requirements for protection of classified information.
According to fulfillment of the requirements the selected device could be allowed to process classified information.
Otherwise, the device is rejected. Free choice of a commercial device and its usage in classified information
systems poses an information leakage risk [16–19].

2. Research methodology
In order to demonstrate the danger associated with sensitive emissions in real conditions, a series of tests in a
so-called open space and oﬃce rooms were carried out, in which a typical laser printer with a laser system based
on two diodes was used. This danger is a very important issue because sensitive emissions could propagate in an
uncontrolled way and they could be used for noninvasive data acquisition. Distances of propagation of sensitive
emissions could be very significant.
The chosen printer was characterized by slightly higher levels of electromagnetic emissions, which is not
an isolated phenomenon. It is also possible to select one of several devices characterized by very low levels of
sensitive emissions. However, the selection is very diﬃcult and time-consuming, but only then can the chosen
commercial device be used to organize a workstation for the processing of protected information. The cause of
loss of information could be incorrect selection of the device.
At present, laser systems of printers first of all are based on two-diode systems, which can be observed in
Figure 1. The systems are controlled by serial signals. The phenomenon is very positive from the electromagnetic
infiltration process point of view. Each of the diodes is stimulated by an independent signal, the structure of
which varies with a change in the print mode. Of course, LED slat systems are also used. However, such a
solution is not considered. The possibilities of using printers with LED slats are described in [8]. It was pointed
out that LED slat systems are resistant to electromagnetic infiltration processes.
Appropriate tests were carried out for diﬀerent distances between the antenna and laser printer during
printing of the same text, as shown in Figure 2. The text was written using capital and lowercase letters of
Arial font, lowercase letters of Symmetrical Safe font, Asymmetrical Safe font, and Symmetrical Safe font with a
constant height [20]. The characters of the mentioned fonts were written without spaces and with single spaces.
The size of the used font was 14 points.
The obtained results confirmed that the phenomenon of so-called leakage of information not only exists
in isolated electromagnetic environments (e.g., anechoic chamber, Figure 3) [8]; the phenomenon can also exist
in typical working environments. Taking into account the possibility of an “eavesdropping” workstation right
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Figure 1. An example of a photoconductor exposure
system based on two-diode laser system.

Figure 2. A printed text.

behind the wall of an oﬃce room, as shown in Figure 4, in which protected information is processed, the
phenomenon of electromagnetic eavesdropping creates a danger in most cases [16].

Figure 3. An anechoic chamber.

Figure 4. Example for an electromagnetic eavesdropping
process.

Special devices have additional constructional solutions. They have to limit the level of electromagnetic
emissions correlated with processed information [16]. These solutions are power filters, signal filters, electromagnetic shields and gaskets, and others [18]. These devices are very expensive. However, we can use commercial
equipment, but we have to select the appropriate operation mode of such devices. The operation mode has to
be an ineﬀective source of unwanted emissions. Earlier examinations of emission sources were carried out for
diﬀerent types of screens. Diﬀerent resolutions of displayed images on the screens were tested from the point of
view of a range of leakage of information [2]. In this case, it was shown that sensitive emissions exist and they
are measured in a distance of about 20 m from the source of emissions in the oﬃce space and 30 m in the open
area. Such studies were not carried out for printers. In particular, the impact of printing quality mode on the
range of leakage of information was not tested.
Selection of frequencies and measurement bandwidths of sensitive emissions is dependent on the physical
size of the equipment and required signal-to-noise ratio, respectively. If the structure or layout of a device
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provides good antenna characteristics, the signals will use the parasitic antenna and radiate from the system
into the air. The bandwidth of a sensitive emission measurement also has to be small enough to suppress the
powerful signals from neighboring signal sources and large enough for the observed data rate.
The test signal bandwidth was determined according to the following formula:
BW =

W · L · dpi2
,
t

(1)

where:
BW -the signal bandwidth for printing of one picture point (Hz);
W -the width of the printing area (inches);
L-the length of the printing area (inches);
dpi -the printing resolution (the number of dots per inch);
t– the printing time of the one page (seconds).
We have to notice that the above formula only approximates the value of signal bandwidth. Very often
we obtain better results for smaller values of signal bandwidth. In our case we had: W = 6.27 in, L = 9.69 in,
dpi = 600, and t = 2 s. Then BW ≈ 10 MHz.
During the tests the sensitive emissions were measured in bandwidths equal to 1 MHz, 2 MHz, and 5
MHz, in the frequency range from 2 MHz to 1 GHz [6,8,19]. The frequency range from 2 MHz to 1 GHz was
selected as a result of many years of experiences in the testing of laser printers and screens. The mentioned
values of the bandwidths are the most eﬀective for sensitive emissions from laser printers. In case of analyses of
range of leakage of information in oﬃce rooms and open space, reveal emissions were measured at frequencies
of 25 MHz, 72 MHz, 73 MHz, 170 MHz, 294 MHz, 342 MHz, 666 MHz, and 701 MHz. The one appearing at
frequency 170 MHz was strongest. This emission was analyzed because it was the most unfavorable from the
point of view of range of leakage of information. Signal sampling frequency was equal to 62 MS/s. During the
tests, the TEMPEST DSI 1550A receiving system (20 Hz to 22 GHz), which can be observed in Figure 5a,
and an antenna system from Rohde-Schwarz, which can be observed in Figure 5b, were applied. The antenna
system consists of a rod antenna (100 Hz to 30 MHz), a biconical antenna (30 MHz to 200 MHz), and a dipole
antenna (200 MHz to 1 GHz). During the tests, the laser printer worked with the TEMPEST computer, as
seen from Figure 6, which was certified for electromagnetic safety. The reason for this choice was the fact that
a typical computer has higher levels of electromagnetic emissions than the TEMPEST computer [6,14]. These
emissions can “cover” the reveal emissions. Then the carrying out of the electromagnetic infiltration process
becomes impossible.
The sensitive emissions strongly correlating with the printed document were recorded at frequencies of
72 MHz, 73 MHz, and 170 MHz, in the distance of r = 8, 12, and 15 m for oﬃce rooms, as shown in Figure 7,
and r = 10, 15, 20, and 25 m for the open space. The receiving antenna was placed in the gate of the anechoic
chamber and the printer was placed outside of the chamber, as shown in Figure 8. The printing of data was
carried out for 600 dpi × 600 dpi resolution with Eco printing mode. The analysis of sensitive data from the
laser printer, depending on the distance of the reception, was based on the visual analysis of reconstructed
images. This is the most frequently used method in the case of electromagnetic infiltration of video tracks of
information processing devices.
The Eco printing mode was selected due to its high susceptibility to electromagnetic infiltration [1,2].
We very often use the printing mode to save printing material, especially toner powder. The source of sensitive
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KUBIAK/Turk J Elec Eng & Comp Sci

a)

b)

Figure 5. a) The TEMPEST test system DSI 1550A and b) antenna system.

Figure 6. The workstation: TEMPEST computer (main
unit, display, keyboard, and mouse) and the commercial
test printer.

Figure 7. A scheme of oﬃces and location of receiving
antenna and test device.

Figure 8. A test system to measure a sensitive emission from laser printer in open area.

emissions corresponding to the Eco printing (quality) mode is very eﬀective. Its distinctive features are very
strong. However, this does not mean that the printing using the Best option is safe. The infiltration susceptibility
of a printing device mainly depends on a laser diode control solution applied by the producer. Thus, in one type
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of devices the Best printing mode may be more susceptible to electromagnetic eavesdropping (higher dynamics
of the useful signal changes, as shown in Figure 9a), and in another type this option may be characterized
by significant resistance [8] (lower dynamics of the useful signal changes, as shown in Figure 9b). The useful
signal is an electric signal that forces the operation of the two-diode laser system of the printer. The signal has
distinctive features connected with processed (printed) information and the signal could be a source of sensitive
emissions.

a)

b)

Figure 9. Useful signals of the laser diode for Best mode and for diﬀerent solutions of printers: a) high dynamics of
system, b) low dynamics of system.

Figure 9 shows some examples of useful signals for the Best printing mode. The high dynamics of changes
of signal amplitude, as shown in Figure 9a, make the source of the unwanted emissions very eﬀective. The filling
of the printed line is point by point. This means that the line consists of single points separated by nonprinted
points. In this case, the printed line has many distinctive features. This phenomenon is favorable for the
electromagnetic infiltration process. These features allow to reproduce the printed data line by line. Each point
of the line is identified by the beginning and the end of the pulse for each point at the output of the information
infiltration channel (IIC), which has the characteristics of a high-pass filter [4,10,13]. The printing with the
Best mode can be implemented completely diﬀerently. An example is shown in Figure 8b. In this case, the
voltage amplitude of the signal corresponding to the printed line is constant. There is a lack of fast changes of
voltage amplitude. The printed line does not have many distinctive features. At the output of the IIC, each
printed line is identified by the beginning and the end of a pulse, for which the duration corresponds to the
length of the printed line. This phenomenon is not favorable for the electromagnetic infiltration process. The
characteristics of sensitive emission are susceptible to electromagnetic disturbance.
Therefore, does printing quality impact the change of electromagnetic infiltration capability? Does it
directly translate into the quality of recreated images? The obtained data are presented below.
3. Test results
3.1. Range of leakage of information
Attention should be drawn to a very important aspect: the possibility of recoding and further digital processing
of the reconstructed images. As mentioned before, the possibility of presenting retrieved data in a graphical
form understandable for humans transforms the sources to video lines of “eavesdropped” devices. However,
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there are diﬀerences between the means of control of end devices (emission sources) that visualize the processed
data.
In the case of screens we deal with the repetition of images [2,4,6], which allows for the recording of several
and even several dozens of realizations of disclosing emission signals, corresponding to nearly the same original
image. “Eavesdropping” of printing devices does not provide information about several copies of the same
pages of printed data. The phenomenon of repetition of information is very important for further processing of
visualized images that are very noisy [21,22], in the case of which a so-called images summing process could be
applied. This method significantly improves the value of the signal-to-noise ratio [23,24]. Unfortunately, this
method is significantly limited in the case of printing devices since the data printing process may be accompanied
by a disclosing emission that corresponds to a single identical page only unless a serial printing of a single page
is carried out.
The other problem is the division of recorded realizations into time intervals corresponding to particular
pages of the printout [1,3,8]. In the case of printers, when the beginning of the printout of subsequent pages does
not have to occur in strictly specified times, the designation of the beginnings of pages in order to sum them
is very diﬃcult. In the case of a screen, in which a set refresh frequency occurs, the issue of synchronization of
reconstructed images does not cause significant problems.
Figures 10 and 11 contain the test results in the form of images retrieved from emissions recorded in an
open space and in oﬃce rooms, respectively. The increase of measuring distance r from the printing device
deteriorates the perception features of obtained images. Nevertheless, as seen from Figure 12, the levels of
occurring sensitive emissions are high enough to allow their graphical reproduction [23,25–27]. Moreover, they
become legible, especially in the case of use of the Arial font. Characters of safe fonts act as protection against
electromagnetic infiltration, which can be observed in Figures 9 and 11.

a)

b)

Figure 10. The fragments of images (inversion) obtained from sensitive signal emissions ( f0 = 170 MHz, BW = 5
MHz, 600 dpi, Eco) measured in open area for distances of: a) 10 m, b) 25 m.

The majority of measured electromagnetic emissions, which exceed the level of environmental disturbances
occurring in an anechoic chamber, are not correlated with the processed information [16]. These are emissions
that are generated as a result of operation of elements that take part in the document printing. These include
the stepper motors, heater, and power supply circuits. In many cases, from the electromagnetic protection
point of view, they are beneficial since they constitute a “masking” element for sensitive emissions, which may
eﬃciently counteract the electromagnetic infiltration process. Therefore, diﬀerent designs of commercial devices,
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a)

b)

c)

Figure 11. The fragments of images (inversion) obtained from sensitive signal emissions ( f0 = 170 MHz, BW = 5
MHz, 600 dpi, Eco) measured in oﬃces for distances of: a) 8 m, b) 12 m, c) 15 m.

Figure 12. The levels of electromagnetic emission measured from a printer, BW = 1 MHz and r = 1 m (measurement
according to MIL-STD-461G).

aiming to adapt those devices for processing of classified information, must be applied with great sensitivity.
The sources of so-called typical emissions must not be modified, since their elimination may “uncover” the
undesirable emissions and the level of sensitivity of a device will unexpectedly increase.
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3.2. Printing mode of laser printer and eﬀectiveness of electromagnetic eavesdropping
The level of eﬃciency of electromagnetic eavesdropping and its range strongly depend on the printing mode
of the printing device [8]. In particular, the printer provides two printing quality modes: Eco and Best. The
printing mode of the laser system depends on devices specifications, e.g., firmware, and in the system of two
laser diodes it may be implemented through:
− The operation of two laser diodes stimulated by a pulse signal (variation of voltage amplitude of the
useful signal is very fast; as a result, we can observe not only vertical and diagonal edges of reconstructed
elements, but we see complete signs), printing each line of the image – the Best printing mode as shown in
Figure 13a. The revealed emission is not susceptible to electromagnetic disturbance. The range of leakage
of information is wide.
− The operation of two laser diodes stimulated by a constant signal (voltage amplitude of useful signal is
almost constant; we can observe only vertical and diagonal edges of reconstructed elements), printing
every second line of the image – the Eco printing mode as shown in Figure 13b. The distinctive features
of reveal emission are not strong. They are susceptible to electromagnetic disturbance. Reconstructed
data are diﬃcult to understand. The range of leakage of information is short.
− The operation of a single diode stimulated by a pulse signal (variation of voltage amplitude of the useful
signal is very fast; as a result, we can observe not only vertical and diagonal edges of reconstructed
elements, but we see complete signs), printing every line of the image – the Eco printing mode as shown
in Figure 13c. At the output of the IIC each reconstructed line is identified as a sequence of points. They
are strong distinctive features, which are not susceptible to electromagnetic disturbance. The range of
leakage of information is big.
The selection of the printing mode simultaneously shapes the nature of the source of undesired emissions.
The tests demonstrate that the most eﬃcient source of such emissions is the operation of one or two diodes
when the variation of the voltage amplitude of the useful signal is very fast. When the voltage amplitude of the
useful signal is almost constant, the source of the sensitive emission is not eﬀective from the electromagnetic
eavesdropping point of view, as shown in Figure 13b.
As a result of the impact of the IIC of radiation type, only vertical and diagonal edges of graphical
elements are displayed in a form of single points as displayed every second line in Figure 14. In an anechoic
chamber, the increase of the distance of electromagnetic eavesdropping to 7–8 m prevents execution of an
eﬃcient process of electromagnetic infiltration. The values of the pixels’ amplitudes associated with single
points (for the distance of 1 m), which outline the vertical and diagonal edges of the graphical elements, are
significantly reduced [10,11]. As a result, they are unnoticeable, and acquiring information using a noninvasive
method becomes impossible. Besides, the oﬃce rooms reduce the r distance several meters, to approximately
2–3 m.
4. Conclusions
The article presents the results of tests of sensitive emissions measured for diﬀerent distances r . The tests were
carried out for diﬀerent electromagnetic environments: an open space and oﬃce rooms. The “eavesdropped”
device was a printer with two-diode laser system.
The obtained results of the tests confirmed the existing risk associated with the electromagnetic infiltration in an environment, described as follows:
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a)
useful signal in time domain

reconstructed image basing on useful signal

b)
useful signal in time domain

reconstructed image basing on useful signal

measured in line

measured in line

reconstructed image basing on signal of reveal

reconstructed image basing on signal of reveal
emission (f o = 666 MHz, BW = 5 MHz)

emission (f o = 666 MHz, BW = 20 5 MHz)

c)
useful signal in time domain

reconstructed image basing on useful signal
measured in line

reconstructed image basing on signal of reveal
emission (f o = 701 MHz , BW = 5 MHz)

Figure 13. Useful signals for diﬀerent quality of printing modes: a) Best, b) Eco, c) Eco, the forms of printed data
corresponding to the useful signals and forms of reconstructed data based on signals of reveal emission.
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Figure 14. Reconstructed image (inversion) on basis of sensitive signal, receiving frequency fo = 701 MHz, BW = 5
MHz, working mode 600 × 600 dpi with option Eco, r = 1 m in anechoic chamber.

a)

b)

Figure 15. Reconstructed images (inversion) based on sensitive signals ( r = 1 m) from laser printer: a) receiving
frequency fo = 294 MHz, BW = 5 MHz and working mode is 600 dpi × 600 dpi with option Eco, b) receiving frequency
fo = 294 MHz, BW = 2 MHz and working mode is 600 dpi × 600 dpi with option Eco.

− with additional electromagnetic emission sources and
− obstacles that deteriorate the propagation properties, like building walls and metal structures.
Obstacles may reduce the eﬃciency of noninvasive acquisition of information. The quality of reproduced
images demonstrates that distances r = 25 m and r = 12 m for the open space and the oﬃce rooms do not
have to be obstacles in the electromagnetic infiltration process.
However, the level of eﬀectiveness of the process strongly depends on the type of the device that processes
the data and its eﬃciency as a source of undesirable emissions. The reason for that is the fact that there are
commercial device readouts of data from reproduced images in very restricted ranges even for r = 1 m as seen
from Figure 15. The data included in the image are not legible and they are very weakly distinguishable. This
image shows that we could select a device for which levels of sensitive emissions could be lower. Then the range
of leakage of information is shorter. However, this situation does not exist often.
The obtained results show that the risk connected with the leakage of information exists in both the open
area and space oﬃces. The level of the risk depends on the character of the sensitive emission source. The range
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of the leakage of information is diﬃcult to determine. It particularly depends on the construction of walls and
other elements that disturb the electromagnetic wave. Therefore, determining the optimum distance between a
printer and an eavesdropping workstation for diﬀerent electromagnetic environments is not easy.
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